Iron Throne: Kingdom — Another Failed Game Release By Netmarble

Summary:

Netmarble’s newly released game Iron Throne: Kingdom is a failure based on App Annie data.

While the stock did fall to a low of 123,000 KRW in August 2017, it has since recovered since April 2018 due to a timely 25%  investment in a Korean music label that is home to the K-Pop sensation BTS.

Once the failure of this new game become evident to investors, we believe that the stock will again test its all time low of 123,000 KRW.

Analysis

Our analysis of Netmarble’s April 2017 IPO was that it was “priced for perfection”.  While the Lineage 2 game releases have been near perfect in Korea and Japan, its release in the USA has been a bust and the release in China is on hold due to geopolitical tensions.

As a result, we predicted that Netmarble’s stock would fall 45% from its November 26, 2017 closing price of 188,500 KRW to around 103,378 KRW once the revenue impacts of the USA and China releases were fully understood by investors.

While the stock did fall to a low of 123,000 KRW in August 2017, it has since recovered since April 2018 due to a timely 25%  investment in a Korean music label that is home to the K-Pop sensation BTS

Recently, Netmarble announced a May 2018 world-wide release of another MMO game called Iron Throne: Kingdom.

Based on App Annie data, we can already tell that the game is a bust with a global annualized revenue run rate (ARR)  that will never be more that $50 Million USD.  This is a drop in the bucket for Netmarble whose 2017 revenue in the range of $2,000 Million USD.

Here are the current revenue ranks on iOS Apple Store for the Iron Throne: Kingdom:

  • USA — #177
  • Japan – #363
  • South Korea — #29

The relation between revenue and revenue rank for mobile games is a power function which we have discussed in other papers.  A top 3 revenue rank game generally translates into a ARR of $1+ Billion which was the case for Lineage II.  A top 10 game drops down severely to $ 160 ARR.

Here are the App Annie revenue rank charts for the game on iOS Apple for the USA, Japan, and South Korea.

iOS USA — revenue rank 177 on June 4, 2018

iOS Japan – revenue rank 262 on June 4, 2018


MZ (Machine Zone) and Its Satori Platform

Satori® – Towards a P2P Crypto-Economic Platform

 

Towards A Crypto-Economic Market Design: Discrete-Time, High Frequency, P2P

 

Machine Zone (MZ): A $10 Billion Dollar Unicorn in the Making

 

Edge Computing Use Cases for MZ’s (Machine Zone) Platform

Machine Zone and The Perversity of Unicorn Lists

 

Machine Zone (MZ): A $4 Billion Unicorn That Walks the Walk

 

Machine Zone: IPO or What?


Netmarble Games IPO: A Fast Fade for Lineage 2?

Introduction

Netmarble is the largest mobile game publisher in South Korea.

The company has just secured investor commitments to buy 16.9 Million shares worth $2.3 Billion in a May 2017 IPO on the Korea KOSPI stock exchange.  

This IPO would value the company at $11 Billion based on investor demand at the high end of the offer range of $138 USD / share (or 157,000 Korean Won / share)

This is a very big deal. It would be the largest IPO on the Korean exchange since 2010 and second largest tech IPO in the world in the last two years after Snap and ahead of Line.

We will show in detail below that this is a highly speculative IPO, even for mobile game companies who are often dismissed by investors as being one hit wonders.

This IPO is unlike the disappointing mobile game IPOs of King Digital Entertainment in 2014 and Zynga in 2011 where both companies had enough audited numbers in their S-1s to suggest that their best days were behind them.

On the contrary, Netmarble’s best days are ahead of them.  But, investors are insane to give this company such a lofty valuation based entirely on unaudited revenue numbers of a single new game launched only four months ago.

We will present evidence hinting that early annualized revenue run rates (ARR) for the game have slipped noticeably in March 2017 — the third month since launch.  We predict that once investors realize this, the stock should drop 30+% from its expected IPO price.

Evidence of a Drop-off in ARR

On December 13, 2016 Netmarble launched a mobile role-playing game called Lineage ll: Revolution  (L2R) based on licensed IP from NCSoft’s legendary PC game Lineage. According to app analytics company App Annie, the game immediately rose to #1 on the S. Korean iOS Apple revenue rank charts and has remain so to this day.

 

 Just because L2R has remained ranked #1 on the S. Korean charts for the past four months, and likely will continue to do so for months, it is still possible that ARR has declined by $100s of Millions since release.

This is because there is a severe power function relation in the mobile game industry between ARR and revenue rank. Typically, at the top of the USA charts, there can be a $600 Million ARR difference between the #1 and #2 ranked game, say $2.2 Billion ARR for #1 and $1.6 Billion ARR for #2.

For example, below is a power function we derived in an earlier paper on the Netmarble IPO for top ranked games on USA iOS app store.

For the S. Korean chart now, it is conceivable that the gap between #1 ranked L2R and the #2 ranked Everybody’s Marble, also by Netmarble published on Kakao, could be $700 Million or more.

In January 2017, Netmarble told the Korean press L2R generated $176.6 Million in revenue between mid-December 2016 and mid-January 2017. That translates into $2+ Billion ARR.

Obviously, a $2 Billion ARR is not sustainable for the full year of 2017. This is because TOTAL Korean game revenue (mobile + console + PC) was only $4 Billion in 2016, according to Newzoo.

Netmarble has not made any official full year forecasts for L2R nor for the company as a whole. We do know that official 2016 revenue for the total company was $1.34 Billion.

In March 2017 analysts covering the company told The Korea Times  that they expect revenue to double to $2.7 Billion, largely based on the early success of L2R.  Assuming organic growth of around 25%, this implies that the 2017 forecast for L2R would be around $1 Billion.

We present two pieces of evidence that even a $1 Billion in total revenue for 2017 is unlikely.

The first piece of evidence is an App Annie trend chart showing L2R download rank. Note that while L2R was ranked #1 in downloads for the first month since release, downloads have steadily dropped below #30 by late March 2017.  

It is doubtful this drop off was caused by a drop off in advertising by Netmarble.  It is more likely due to a lack of strong word-of-mouth by early players that this is a great game.

The other piece of evidence of a drop off in ARR comes from a monthly summary report put out by SuperData listing the top grossing mobile games globally for that month.  

For February 2017, SuperData reported L2R was the top grossing game globally.  But, for March, it reported that L2R dropped to #10 (See below)

 

 

Valuing Netmarble Based on Realistic Expectations for L2R

As we stated earlier, Netmarble’s IPO is scheduled for May 2017.  Investors have already committed to buying 16.9 Million shares at the top end of the offering range of $138 USD / share or 157,000 Korean won / share.

This values the company at $11.7 Billion.  Dividing that valuation by analysts forecasts for 2017 revenue of $2.7 Billion,  we arrive at valuation of 4.3 time forward ARR.  This ratio enables comparisons with  market-derived valuation ratios of publicly-held companies. 

For example, in another paper of ours on the Netmarble IPO,  we derived a valuation ratio for Com2uS of 2.61.  Com2uS is a Korean-based mobile game company listed on KOSPI exchange.   Com2uS is much better known than Netmarble due to its global hit mobile game Summoners War.  

While Com2uS is growing slower than Netmarble, its future sales are more predictable. Based on this comparison, we concluded that Netmarble’s IPO was overpriced by 26%.

In the spreadsheet below,  we also break down Netmarble’s 2017 overall revenue growth forecast into estimates of organic growth versus new sales from L2R — which we peg at $1 Billion.

 

 The final spreadsheet presents “what if?” analysis of Netmarble’s value and stock price  if more solid evidence starts showing up indicating that L2R’s 2017 ARR will be closer to $600 Million than $1 Billion.

Note that when revenue forecasts are significantly cut back, there is usually a corresponding compression in valuation ratios.  So, we built into our “what if?” analysis a compression of Netmarble’s valuation ratio from 4.3 to 3.5 times forward ARR.  

Official sales figures will start coming from Netmarble a month or so after the end of its 2Q17 quarter in June 2017.  We expect management to guide 2017 revenue well short of initial forecasts of $2.7 Billion due to L2R’s ARR well below $1 Billion.

The stock should fall well below IPO prices.  We predict a decline on the order of 33% by July or August 2017.


A Unicorn Startup’s Kiss of Death: Kabam Field

The year 2016 will be remembered as a year when titillating stories came out about Unicorn excesses — Dropbox’s Chrome Panda sculpture, Hampton Creek’s covert buy-backs of Just Mayo inventory, and Zenefits’ sex in the stairwell.

This is a story about Kabam, another fallen Unicorn, and its excesses. More than just descriptive, we analyze its history to locate the source of its downfall in the emergence of a “talk the talk” culture championed by hired professional managers who focused Kabam on short-term revenue goals and a quick IPO.

We even pinpoint a moment in time when Kabam’s fortunes first turned for the worse — a late December 2013 acquisition of the naming rights to the University of California at Berkeley (Cal or UCB) football field for $18 Million paid over 15 years.

In a March 2014 article, we first predicted that this conceit would be viewed in hindsight as Kabam’s “kiss of death” — a sign foreshadowing bad things about to happen. Sure enough, two and a half years later, the once high flying Kabam now is in the process of being dismantled and sold off.

Kabam’s most valuable asset, its Vancouver studio, has just been sold to the Korean gaming company Netmarble for a reported $800 Million. After this deal closes in 1Q17, the company has announced that the rest of the company’s remaining studios will be offered for sale as acqui-hires. Nothing has been said about the future of Kabam’s three co-founders, but their days as Unicorn executives are over.

Also, nothing has been said yet as to the disposition of the naming rights for the football field. While the future name of Cal’s football field might have low priority for those in charge of disposing of Kabam’s assets, its has enormous social-psychological value to the tens of thousands of people who care passionately about the Cal and its football team.

Where Did Kabam Go Wrong?

Kabam was founded in 2006 by Cal alumni Kevin Chou, Michael Li, and Holly Liu. The company had early success developing mobile “freemium” games based on movie IP licensed from major studios.

But, beginning in 2013. Kabam stopped making visionary choices. In our opinion, this was due to the emergence of a the “talk the talk” culture beginning with the hiring of Steve Swasey from Netflix to be head of Corporate Communications.

In January 2016, Swasey was hired away from Kabam by Lending Club CEO Renaud Laplanche, only to leave several months later after Laplanche was forced out by Lending Club’s Board when they discovered the CEO’s involvement in loan doctoring.

Our interest in Kabam began in 2013 when we discovered the app store analytics company App Annie. We saw a rich set of quantifiable financial data and developed a methodology for translating app store revenue ranking data into global annualized revenue dollars.

Based on comparable valuations for publicly-held companies as a multiple of their revenue, we were able to derive solid valuations for mobile game startups like Kabam and Machine Zone (now rebranded as MZ).

We were also able to make prescient buy recommendations in 2014 for two Japanese publicly-held pure play mobile game companies KLAB and Mixi.

While our focus has been on financial analysis of mobile game companies, in 2014, we starting writing about the differences between MZ and Kabam’s approach to publicity. Not only were the differences between the two extreme, but extreme for Unicorn startups in general.

MZ rarely talks to the press. Between 2013 and today, CEO Gabe Leydon has given two interviews a year and official MZ press releases happen about twice a year. There is no MZ employee chatter to be found on the internet other than anonymous comments on Glassdoor. This is shocking for a tech Unicorn, more extreme than the secretive Palantir, whose core competency is secrecy.

Kabam is the complete opposite of MZ when it comes to publicity. Forget about the number of times the tech press has interviewed CEO Kevin Chou or COO Kent Wakeford. Forget about the progressive “moussing” of CEO Chou’s hair that we have noted in photos and videos over the past five years.

What shocked us was the discovery that Kabam had a practice of issuing press releases every January between 2012 and 2015 giving specific numbers for revenue, headcount and cash in the bank: 2012 (for 2011), 2013 (for 2012), 2014 (for 2013), 2015 (for 2014).

This has allowed us to graph the rise and fall of Kabam’s revenue and headcount — a publicly available graphic that is rare for a tech startup.

The idea for this practice can directly be traced to Kabam’s former SVP of Corporate Communication Steve Swasey. Swasey was also key in pushing the naming rights deal with Cal.

In 2013, CEO Kevin Chou began talking to the press about timetables for an IPO. In early April of 2014, he announced publicly that revenue was forecasted to grow 80% or more and be in the range of $550 — $650 Million.

This public announcement of revenue projections — exceedingly rare for a Unicorn startup — solidified our view of Kabam as an extreme example of a “talk the talk” culture among Unicorn startups.

To achieve its announced short term revenue goals, Kabam started timing new releases to coincide with the releases of mega-hit movie sequels like Fast and Furious and the Hunger Games. The games had no long-term engagement value and “freemium” revenue plummeted within a few months after release. The result was a disastrous string of five failures and one success.

What Should Become of Kabam Field?

The height of Kabam’s “talk the talk” culture occurred in December 2013 when Kabam announced that it bought the naming rights to the Cal’s football field for $18 Million paid over 15 years. One can understand the desire of Kabam’s co-founders, all three Cal grads, to give back to their alma mater.

But, tech founders should wait years after their IPO to consider funding the construction of new university buildings named after them. For example, buildings names on the the Bay Area campus of Stanford and Berkeley include no less than Gates, Allen, Moore, Varian, Hewlett, Packard, and Wozniak.

Now that Kabam is in the process of being dismantled and sold off, the question is what should become of the naming rights to the Cal’s football field?

As we said in the introduction, the name of a university football field has high social-psychological value to the tens of thousands of people who care passionately about Cal and its football team.

The need for the Cal’s administration to address the field renaming issue could not have come at a worse time as they have just fired their football coach Sonny Dykes and Bloomberg has just written an article on university athletics finances naming Cal as the most debt-ridden program in the country. This is largely due to a $400 Million seismic retrofit of the football stadium after the discovery of a fault line running through it.

To begin cleansing Cal football of its recent bout of bad karma, one solution would be for Kabam and its Cal alumni co-founders to pay off the amount due the University from proceeds of the sale of other Kabam assets. The co-founders could also stipulate that the field renaming be crowd-sourced to University alumni and students.

But, one problem with this suggestion is that there is no obvious Cal sports hero or accomplished coach to rename the field after. Marshawn Lynch Field, Pappy Waldorf Field, Joe Kapp Field. All good, but none as obvious as Bryant-Denny Stadium at the University of Alabama or Amos Alonzo Stagg Field at the University of Chicago.

The other problem is that the naming rights to a Division I football field is an appreciating asset. For example, in September, 2015 the University of Washington received a whopping $4.1 Million per year over 10 year for “Alaska Airlines Field” at Husky Stadium. This is over three times Cal’s 2013 deal of $1.2 Million per year over 15 years for “Kabam Field” at California Memorial.

Given that the naming rights are far more valuable today than in 2013, and given the debt-ridden state of Cal’s athletic program, the University would surely prefer a solution involving a cancellation of the Kabam contract and the tendering of fresh bids from corporations.

The University can be expected to derail quietly any populist solution like a crowdsourcing of a new name. No, the University would much prefer Chase Field or PowerBar Field at $4 Million a year than any other solution.


Machine Zone (MZ): A $10 Billion Dollar Unicorn in the Making

(Original publication date: 6/7/16)

(Our suggested “moonshot” for MZ: ending urban traffic congestion via a real-time pricing platform + “connected car”)

(Our suggested new tagline for MZ: “put a price on it.”  Shoutout to Portlandia for its “put a bird on it” tagline for a hand-crafted gift store capturing its big picture strategy)

Short Postscript (12/15/17)

Google Trends confirms that the term “moonshot” peaked one week after writing this article in June 2016.  Moonshot is so 2016 we guess.

While our suggested moonshot for MZ of pricing congestion seemed reasonable back when we first wrote the article, it seems (sadly) downright heretical today given the current chill against open discussion of controversial tech solutions that Y Combinator head Sam Altman has blogged about recently. 

“Put a price on it” is a controversial idea for solving problems.  We hope that folks  will not be deterred by the chill and and continue to stick with it.

Back to original article written 6/7/16) 

In a year when valuations of so-called Unicorns — startups valued at $1+ Billion — are being marked down by investors, we will present the case that Machine Zone, recently rebranded as MZ, is a $10 Billion Unicorn in the making.

This is an audacious claim. A January 2016 Unicorn list compiled by Fortune Magazine assigned a $3 Billion valuation to Machine Zone based on a WSJ report in June 2014 of a funding round of $250 Million led by JPMorgan Chase. There was second hand confirmation of this in Pitchbook.

Machine Zone was not even listed on any Unicorn list a year ago simply because such lists required that valuations be based on reported equity financing with implied valuations of $1+ Billion. Machine Zone’s last reported funding round listed in Crunchbase was a Series B done a full four years ago when Machine Zone was just beginning.

We found Machine Zone’s absence from 2014 Unicorn lists both perverse and ironic. It was perverse in that Machine Zone didn’t need financing so it was excluded from successful startup lists. It was ironic because, unlike most other Unicorns, Machine Zone’s revenue levels and revenue trends are observable daily via app store data reported by analytics companies such as App Annie or Thinkgaming.

On July 15, 2015, Bloomberg reported that the company was in discussions with investors for an additional $200 Million in funding at an implied valuation of $6 Billion. Dean Takahashi of VentureBeat also reported rumours of this new funding round. But, he reported that Machine Zone was seeking $500 Million at an unstated valuation — not the Bloomberg figures. Takahashi’s source also said that “the pitch has met with skepticism.”

Machine Zone has refused to comment on any venture capital interest or funding. As we blogged at the time, compared to most startups who would relish disclosing funding rounds that would confer Unicorn status, Machine Zone “walks the walk, not talks the talk”.

The Evolution of Machine Zone’s Identity

Until this year, Machine Zone’s CEO Gabe Leydon averaged about two interviews a year and never talked about revenue, valuation or IPO plans. He never talked about the state of the mobile game industry. In fact, he rarely talked about Machine Zone’s two hit successes Game of War: Fire Age or Mobile Strike.

Instead, he used rare interviews to advance the theme that Machine Zone was a technology company with software platforms whose applicability and marketability extended beyond games.

In a 2013 interview, Leydon said that Machine Zone had developed a “game engine” that could be “re-skinned” to create other genres of games with the same underlying play and communications innovations. This comment was designed to counter the perception that Machine Zone was a one-hit wonder deserving less of a valuation than mobile game rival Kabam with multiple Top 10 hits at the time.

In 2016, Machine Zone has done just what Leydon predicted in 2013. It had “re-skinned” their top revenue rank Game of War: Fire Age to release another Top 5 revenue rank game Mobile Strike, published by their downtown Palo Alto studio Epic War LLC. What is remarkable to us is that there does not seem to be much cannibalization going on between the two games.

In 2014, Leydon talked about Machine Zone’s real time, crowd-sourced chat translation engine. We wrote several papers speculating that this chat translator would be a valuable addition to Slack as it would open doors to large multi-national corporations.

In a March 2015 interview with Bloomberg’s Robert Kolker, Leydon identified what he thought was the “Wow” factor of its hit game Game of War: Fire Age — the low latency of the game play.

“…Game of War accommodates about 3 million users in simultaneous play, with what the company clocked as a 0.2-second response time…. This is the largest real-time concurrent interactive application ever built. There’s nothing even close to it.”

He also hinted at the marketability of this technology outside of gaming.

An additional signal of Machine Zone’s intent on being a fundamental technology company was a report in the Las Vegas Sun that the data center builder Switch would be expanding its Southern Nevada facility to house 4,000 dedicated servers owned and managed by MZ.  These servers likely feature FPGAs that optimize the speed of MZ’s Erlang-written, publish-subscribe messaging platforms.

On February 18, 2016, Machine Zone and CEO Leydon had a “coming out party”. He broke out of his pattern of infrequent print interviews to give a full blown 39 minute video interview at the important Code/Media 2016 Conference.

In our opinion, it was here that Leydon first demonstrated his charm and ease at speaking as he mixed in fond memories of 90s skateboard videos with big picture views of the state of ad-tech. The interview was convincing evidence to us that Leydon was capable of leading an IPO and being the spokesperson for a publicly-held company.

Within the first minute of the interview, Leydon articulated a more focused view of Machine Zone as “real time” technology company. However, because the audience were media and ad-tech people, Leydon did not talk about the software technology at all.

Instead Leydon startled the crowd with sharp criticism of 3rd party buy-side ad-tech platforms and the state of ad-tech in general. He casually revealed that Machine Zone had developed it own ad-buy platform specifically tailored to the acquisition and retention of freemium game players aka “whale targeting and retention”.

This platform was an alternative to relying on outside platforms like Chartboost and Tapjoy, used by Machine Zone’s rival Supercell and other top mobile game companies. According to Crunchbase, Tapjoy has received a total of $2.47 Billion in VC funding over the years.

Once again, by building its own buy-side ad-tech platform, Machine Zone has set itself apart from other mobile app Unicorns. Supercell, its chief rival in the mobile game industry, uses Amazon AWS for infrastructure and Tapjoy for ad-tech. Supercell does not have any internal chat function for players to communicate.

On April 4, 2016, Machine Zone issued a press release stating that it had changed its name from Machine Zone to MZ to underscore its new identity as a “real time” technology company. It also announced that it would begin licensing its real time publish-subscribe messaging platform, branded as RTplatform™. Leyton suggested in a follow-up conversation with Venturebeat that RTplatform ™ had wide-spread applicability ”from financial service companies to connected car companies to government institutions”

Valuing MZ’s Mobile Game Business

What follows is an estimate of MZ’s current valuation based solely on its mobile game business. There are three pieces of data required: (1) App Annie revenue ranks for MZ’s games; (2) an estimate of a power function relation between annualized revenue run rate (ARR) and app store revenue rank; and (3) “market-derived” valuations of pure play mobile game companies as a multiple their ARR.

For example, Activision Blizzard recently bought King Digital for 3.08 times ARR. Using that as a comparable and an estimate of MZ’s mobile game ARR of $2.0 Billion, we would arrive at a valuation for MZ of 3.08 * $2.0 Billion = $6 Billion.

We have used this methodology to value MZ over the past 2 years: Machine Zone: The $4 Billion Unicorn that Walks the Walk ; Machine Zone and the Perversity of Unicorn Lists and Machine Zone: IPO or What? (for Seeking Alpha).

We used the same methodology in articles to value other publicly-held mobile game companies — King Digital, Zynga and GLU Mobile — and the start-up Kabam. Finally, we have used the methodology to make prescient buy recommendations for two undervalued Japanese mobile game companies — Mixi and KLAB.

Below are two “market-derived” valuations of pure play mobile game companies as a multiple of ARR. The first is a valuation of 3.08 * ARR that Activision Blizzard paid to acquire publicly-held King Digital in late 2015. Using King’s ARR, as reported in 10-Qs to the SEC as a checksum, we present below an estimate of the distribution of King’s ARR by individual game revenue and associated revenue rank as reported by App Appie.

king-valuation

The second is a market-derived valuation for Finland-based Supercell. While the company is not listed on a stock exchange, it is required by Finnish law to report financials once a year. In 2015, Supercell reported revenue of $2.326 Billion. We coupled that with a reported $5.5 Billion valuation that Softbank placed on Supercell when it bought an additional 22 percent stake in Supercell (bringing its ownership to 73 percent) in mid-2015.

As with the King valuation, we use Supercell’s reported 2015 revenue as a checksum when estimating the distribution of Supercell’s ARR by individual game revenue and related revenue rank.

supercell-valuation

For our valuation of MZ here, we chose the lower, more conservative, Supercell valuation of 2.36 * ARR. The higher 3.08 * ARR that Activision-Blizzard paid for King Digital was 20% higher that the market value of King at the time. Plus, most financial pundits felt that Activision-Blizzard paid too much for King.

In past valuation of MZ, we chose 2.5 * ARR based on market-derived valuations of publicly-held Japanese gaming companies. Given, the general downward drift in Unicorn valuations, the use of the lowest multiple of 2.36 * ARR seems appropriate today.

Based on the estimates above of individual game revenue associated with various iOS Apple USA revenue rank as reported by App Annie, we derive an estimate below of a 2016 power function of global ARR vs iOS USA revenue rank.

power-function-2016

We now present a current valuation of MZ based on its two hit games alone which rank #2 and #3 on the App Annie iOS USA revenue charts.

mz-valuation-april-2016

Note: during the writing of this paper in April 2016, Supercell’s Clash Royale and MZ’s Game of War have traded #1 and #2 positions multiple times. We are being conservative in our valuation here by using the lower #2 ranking for Game of War. Had we chosen #1 for Game of War with an associated ARR of $2.1 Billion, our valuation for MZ’s game business would have come in at $7.3 Billion instead of $5.7 Billion

Use Cases for RTplatform™

We place the MZ’s valuation today at $9.1 Billion as a fundamental technology company. We think the valuation for its ad-tech platform is fair at $1.0 Billion, give that VC’s have poured over $2.7 Billion so far into Tapjoy, a comparable platform. We think the licensing value of its chat translator is fair at $400 Million, given the doors it might open for Slack. There might even be interest in the chat translator from Facebook or Microsoft, given the current interest in text messaging as a replacement for apps and mobile OS.

valuation-of-mz-as-a-tech-co

Addendum 3/8/18:  Here is an article of ours on MZ’s newly branded demand side platform (DSP): “Lemons” And Antitrust: Two Forces Driving Facebook’s Work WIth MZ’s DSP Cognant 

Addendum 6/13/18: Here are several more articles of ours on the division of MZ into a game company — MZ – and a real-time crypto-economic platform called Satori® with Gabe Leydon as CEO.

Toward a P2P Market Design for a Crypto-Economy  (6/10/18)

Satori: Toward a True P2P (Post-Walrasian) Crypto-Economic Platform (6/3/18)

Admittedly, our $2.0 Billion valuation for RTplatform™ is the most speculative component as no comparable market-derived valuations are offered. One factor that caused us to value it so highly was the very fact that MZ hyped it. Here was a Unicorn company and CEO who had “walked the walk” for years and never made comparisons. Suddenly, it started “talking the talk.” as in “our specs crush your specs” and “ our new specs crush our old specs.” We believe the company can make good on the hype, given their amazing string of accomplishments.

According to the Venturebeat interview on the day of the launch, the company said its platform was “much more scalable than what is currently available in the market from rivals like Amazon or Google…” Leydon said PTplatform™ was “100 times bigger” than its current platform running Game of War.

The other factor underlying our high valuation was the use cases and market potential we were envisioning for a platform described by the company as a

  • massive platform for doing high-fanout data processing,”
  • many-to-many applications
  • an infrastructure that allows you to do some extremely large things in real time at scale.”
  • “unique ability to interconnect ‘billions’ of endpoints worldwide and transmit data at low latency”

In the Venturebeat interview, the company hinted at use cases “from financial service companies to connected car companies to government institutions”. In earlier interviews, Leydon hinted that its game engine was transactional with ultra low latency. He compared it to platforms required for high frequency trading.

We present the following broad use cases for a real-time pricing or auction platform coupled with the “connected self” or the “connected car”:

  1. eliminate information asymmetry and “moral hazard” between insurers and customers;
  2. eliminate the “tragedy of the commons” like urban traffic congestion or overfishing;
  3. eliminate transactions costs causing “sticky prices” for services whose performance over time is uncertain;

A specific use case for (1) would be real time auto insurance pricing. In 2014, consumer auto insurance had been estimated to be a $190 Billion market. MZ should be targeting one of the top 4 auto insurers — State Farm, Geico, Allstate, and Progressive — as an exclusive licensee. They should aim for an announcement within the next three months, with a roll-out and initial monetization within a year.

This “early win” will shock the auto insurance industry, impress the VC investment community, and finally clue tech writers that MZ should listed along with handful of unicorns — Uber, Airbnb, WeWork, Palantir and Slack — as having the greatest upside potential.

A specific use case for (2) would be a real-time auction for peak commute time on urban freeways. There is an article in Forbes citing a report which estimated the direct and indirect costs of traffic congestion at $124 Billion in 2013.

There was also something called the Millennium Project out of UC-Berkeley in the mid-2000 which used (then novel) mobile phones to gather data on drive times and traffic congestion in the Bay Area. In 2011, there was a report which presented in detail the problems in ”scaling up the Mobile Millennium traffic information system using cloud computing and the Spark cluster computing framework”.

Surely, the 2016 RTplatform™ would be a prime candidate to underpin any solution to urban traffic congestion. Needless to say, solving this problem would require government sponsorship so monetization by MZ for this use case might be a 5+ years off. But, announcing that it would be involved in a project to end urban traffic congestion would place MZ alongside only a handful of companies undertaking a “moonshot” and “make a difference in the world” type of project.

A specific use case for (3) would be dynamic pricing for sporting and entertainment events. Many Major League Baseball team are setting aside bleacher sections with individual game day tickets that vary by day of week, opponent, and weather. The National Football League is also starting to set aside individual game day tickets that vary over the course of the season by attractiveness of the matchup.

We could envision MZ’s platform taking this dynamic pricing of sporting events to a “real time” level by allowing both baseball and football fans to bid on game day seats inning by inning or quarter by quarter. Obviously, this use case seems ludicrous, but it does emphasize widespread instances of “sticky prices” due to transaction costs for a steam of services with uncertain, highly variable quality.